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NATO and the United Nations During UNPROFOR (Abstract) - Jane Boulden 
 
The conflict in Bosnia in the early 1990s was the source of a number of firsts for the 
international community. For NATO it marked the first time that its troops were involved 
in military action. For both the United Nations and NATO it was the first time that the 
two organizations worked together in dealing with a situation of conflict. And for both 
organizations, this experience occurred at a time of transition. NATO was seeking to 
redefine itself in the post-Cold War era and was debating the possibility of enlargement. 
The United Nations was riding a post-Cold War wave of optimism about its ability to 
deal with international peace and security issues. For both organizations the experience 
was a harsh one, almost bringing both to the breaking point. A number of lessons flow 
from this, for the organizations individually and together, as well as for the international 
community as a whole.  
 
This paper examines the NATO-UN relationship as it developed and evolved during the 
UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia. It does so by first exploring the origins of both 
organizations and how they each envisaged their relationship with the other. The specific 
experience in Bosnia is then examined with a special focus on the debate and decision-
making surrounding the use of air power and air strikes. A number of conclusions and 
questions flow from the analysis. First, NATO survived a very severe test of its unity and 
capabilities. Its involvement in the Bosnian crisis and the various problems that this 
created for the alliance occurred precisely at the time when the alliance itself was in the 
midst of a major political transition. NATO’s survival, therefore, speaks a great deal 
about the value alliance members place on its continued existence and strength. It also 
speaks to the extent to which a regional conflict in which alliance members have different 
levels of commitment to involvement can create serious internal divisions.  
 
Second, the involvement of NATO as the implementer of Security Council resolutions 
meant the addition of more than just NATO’s military assets to the United Nations 
decision-making process. NATO’s military involvement brought with it an added layer of 
political decision-making. And with that added layer came a number of complications, 
the most problematic of which was the impact on the UN’s own political position in the 
conflict. In a situation such as that presented by the Bosnian conflict it is unlikely that an 
organization such as NATO will provide military assets for implementation of UN 
resolutions without becoming involved in the political decision-making process. This 
conclusion raises a critical question for the international community – is it possible for 
the United Nations to maintain its impartiality in these situations when a regional 
organization is involved in the operation? The UNPROFOR experience demonstrates that 
the maintenance of impartiality should not be assumed when regional organizations 
become involved in such situations. This is a difficult example, however, from which to 
make a judgement on that question. The problems that arose with respect to impartiality 
in this case may be as much an indication that a policy of impartiality was ill-suited to the 
situation as it is an indication of a problem connected to NATO-United Nations 
cooperation.  
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NATO and the United Nations During UNPROFOR  
 
By Jane Boulden 
 
Introduction 
 
The conflict in Bosnia in the early 1990s was the source of a number of firsts for the 
international community. For NATO it marked the first time that its troops were involved 
in military action. For both the United Nations and NATO it was the first time that the 
two organizations worked together in dealing with a situation of conflict. And for both 
organizations, this experience occurred at a time of transition. NATO was seeking to 
redefine itself in the post-Cold War era and was debating the possibility of enlargement. 
The United Nations was riding a post-Cold War wave of optimism about its ability to 
deal with international peace and security issues. For both organizations the experience 
was a harsh one, almost bringing both to the breaking point. A number of lessons flow 
from this, for the organizations individually and together, as well as for the international 
community as a whole.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the NATO-UN relationship as it developed and 
evolved during the UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia. The first section of the paper 
examines how the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations 
was originally envisaged and how it came to be articulated in the United Nations Charter. 
The second section provides a brief overview of the origins of NATO and how its 
creation related to the United Nations. The third section picks up after the end of the Cold 
War when the idea of greater cooperation between the United Nations and regional 
organizations is advocated by the UN Secretary-General, and when NATO begins to 
contemplate taking on military tasks in support of UN missions. Against this background, 
the fourth section provides a detailed overview of the events and decisions that led to 
NATO taking on close air support and later air strikes in support of the UNPROFOR 
mission. The debate within NATO as to the extent and desirability of its involvement, the 
UN's decisions on how to respond to events on the ground, and how the two 
organizations chose to deal with one another are examined along with the events and 
decisions themselves. Drawing together the theory and the practice - the ideas about the 
relationship between the two organizations, as originally envisaged by both, and the 
actual dynamics of the UNPROFOR experience - the conclusions outline the lessons of 
the experience and highlight problems and issues that need to be addressed for successful 
interaction in the future.  
 
I. Origins of the Regional Organization and Self Defence Provisions in the Charter  
 
Like much of the content of the United Nations Charter, the provisions relating to 
regional arrangements were the product of two inter-related recent experiences: the 
failure of the League of Nations and World War II. In this context, the Charter drafters 
were keenly aware of the impact of a lack of universality in any international security 
  2 organization, and the consequences of inaction when conflict is left unchecked in its early 
stages. The question of how and even if regional organizations had a role to play in 
dealing with issues of peace and security related to both of these critical issues. In the 
first instance, the United States was concerned that nothing in the proposed Charter 
should detract from the primacy of the Security Council on international peace and 
security questions. Other countries, however, particularly those in Europe and Latin 
America, wanted an ability to respond to conflict within their regions, in the event that 
the Security Council was unable or unwilling to do so.  
 
No one disputed the idea that regional organizations had a role to play and a right to exist 
within the context of an overarching international organization. The question was how to 
fit the two together so that regional organizations could fulfill their own peace and 
security objectives without detracting from the goals of the international organization. 
Determining the exact nature of that fit raised a number of difficult questions for those 
negotiating the terms of the Charter. How should a regional organization or arrangement 
be defined? Should the Security Council have a role in deciding whether or not an 
organization was suited to deal with peace and security issues? What kind of freedom of 
action should these regional groups have in dealing with conflict situations?
1 These 
questions went to the heart of the concept of the international organization being 
negotiated, prompting two quite different responses. For some the overwhelming need 
was to ensure the universality of the new organization and the primacy of the Security 
Council's role in dealing with conflict, in order to guard against the possibility that 
decentralization of responsibility for action would eventually undermine the organization. 
Others believed that the possibility for inaction by the Security Council meant that 
provision should be made for action to be taken by others so that conflict was not left 
unchecked, possibly leading to major war.  
 
Pressure for greater freedom of movement for regional arrangements came from Latin 
American countries and some European countries. The former were determined that the 
new international organization not infringe on the existing inter-American agreements 
among Latin American states.
 2  European countries, especially Britain, France and the 
Soviet Union, wanted to ensure that their existing defensive arrangements, established to 
deal with the possibility of renewed German aggression, would not be affected, and 
argued that these treaties be specifically exempted from the proposed charter's 
provisions.
3  
  
This issue directly affected the extent to which the new international organization would 
be the primary and universal tool for dealing with international peace and security issues, 
                                                 
1 For a good overview of how these questions featured in the early stages of the debate and negotiations on 
the formation of the United Nations Charter, see Ruth B. Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter, 
The Role of the United States 1940-1945, Washington D.C., Brookings, 1958, pp. 107-108, 398-399, 472-
474.  
2 For example, the Act of Chapultepec, 3 March 1945. The Act included provisions for dealing with 
conflict within the region.  
3 See Russell, pp. 691-692. 
  3 and as such it had the potential to be a "deal breaker".
4 As a result, the question of how 
much leeway to give to regional arrangements generated considerable debate within and 
among delegations, and occupied a great deal of the negotiators' time and effort during 
the negotiating conference on the terms of the Charter. The breakthrough in the 
discussions came when negotiators realized that the driving force behind the concerns 
being raised by countries was a fear that in the event of a conflict they would be legally 
constrained from reacting, either because they were forced to wait for a Security Council 
response or because the Security Council chose not to respond. The negotiators realized 
that this concern was not about trying to take power away from the international 
organization but was really about a right to self-defence. With this realization, the Charter 
framers found that the issues they were dealing with fell into two distinct categories. The 
first set of issues concerned the question of self defence and the second related to more 
functional issues such as how (not whether) regional arrangements should relate to the 
Security Council.  
 
Self Defence 
 
The self defence question was dealt with by language proposed by the US delegation. 
Using language that eventually became the basis for Article 51 of the Charter, the 
proposed article affirmed an "inherent" right of self defence but retained the link to the 
Security Council by requiring that all such measures be immediately reported to the 
Security Council. The proposed language read:  
 
Should the Security Council not succeed in preventing aggression, and should 
aggression occur by any state against any member state, such member state 
possesses the inherent right to take necessary measures for self-defense. The right 
to take such measures for self-defense …shall also apply to understandings or 
arrangements like those embodied in the Act of Chapultepec… The taking of such 
measures shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in 
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council …to take 
at any time such action as it may deem necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.
 5 
 
Language stating that member states were only able to act in self defence "until the 
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security" was added to reaffirm the primacy of the Security Council and to make clear 
that while a self defence was “inherent” it was only tenable as an interim measures until 
the Security Council itself responded. In order to indicate that this provision was intended 
to take in the actions of regional arrangements, the term self defence was qualified with 
the addition of the phrase "individual or collective".  
                                                 
4 At the close of the negotiations on this issue, US Senator Vandenberg, who had played a critical role in 
ensuring that the issue did not undermine the Charter negotiations, noted that the issue confronted the 
committee with "an insuperable crisis threatening the life of the Conference". United Nations Conference 
on International Organization (UNCIO), Commission III, Security Council Committee 4, Regional 
Arrangements, Document 916, III/4/15, 12 June 1945, p. 4.  
5 As quoted in Russell, p. 698.  
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In the end, the two elements of the debate came to form two separate sets of provisions 
that were divided between two chapters of the Charter. The self defence provision 
became Article 51 and because of its relationship to the enforcement question, was placed 
in Chapter VII of the Charter while the remaining provisions for regional arrangements, 
including the requirement for reporting to the Security Council, were given their own 
chapter, Chapter VIII.  
 
The term "collective" self defence is one that has generated considerable debate since its 
inclusion in the Charter.
6 But it is clear that the negotiators intended this to cover self 
defence responses by regional organizations. A report on the decisions of the committee 
tasked with dealing with the regional organization question explained it as follows:  
 
In the case of the American states, an aggression against one American state 
constitutes an aggression against all the American states, and all of them exercise 
their right of legitimate defense by giving support to the state attacked, in order to 
repel such aggression. This is what is meant by the right of collective self-
defense.
7 
 
Chapter VIII 
 
Chapter VIII of the Charter, titled Regional Arrangements, comprises three articles. The 
provisions do not define what constitutes a regional arrangement. In the committee 
deliberations on these provisions, the Charter framers determined that attempting a 
definition would create more problems than it would resolve, thus the broad, though 
undefined phrases "regional arrangements" and "regional agencies" are used.
8 Article 52, 
the first of the three articles, notes that the Charter's provisions do not preclude the 
existence of regional arrangements provided those arrangements are consistent with the 
Charter. Paragraph 2 of the article calls on states who are members of such arrangements 
to attempt to settle disputes through those arrangements before submitting them to the 
Security Council and the third paragraph indicates that the Security Council will 
encourage the pacific settlements of disputes through regional arrangements.  
 
In Article 53, the Charter provides that the Security Council will use these regional 
arrangements for enforcement action it authorizes "where appropriate" but makes clear 
that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements …without the 
authorization of the Security Council". The third and final article of the chapter requires 
                                                 
6 See Leland M. Goodrich, Edvard Hambro, Anne Patricia Simons, Charter of the United Nations 
Commentary and Documents, New York, Columbia University Press, 1969, pp. 348-351; John F. Murphy, 
"Force and Arms" in Oscar Schacter, Christopher Joyner, eds., United Nations Legal Order, vol. 1, 
Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 247-317; Derek Bowett, Self Defence in International Law, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1958, pp. 200-248; Charlotte White, …   
7 UNCIO, Commission III, Security Council Committee 4, Regional Arrangements, Document 576, III/4/9, 
25 May 1945, p. 9. Underline in original.  
8 UNCIO, Commission III, Security Council, Committee 4, Regional Arrangements, Document 533, 
III/4/A/9, 23 May 1945, pp. 3-4.  
  5 that regional arrangements keep the Security Council fully informed of activities 
"undertaken or in contemplation" relating to international peace and security.  
 
Together these articles suggest quite an active and cooperative relationship between 
regional arrangements and the UN. In practice, however, until the end of the Cold War, 
virtually no formal activity took place under Chapter VIII auspices.  
 
II. The Creation of NATO 
 
Very soon after the creation of the United Nations the effects of the US-Soviet rivalry 
began to take hold. With both countries holding a veto in the Security Council the 
likelihood of the Security Council agreeing to significant action diminished considerably. 
At the same time, Soviet activities in Eastern Europe generated considerable concern in 
the West. These two trends came together to prompt discussion and negotiation of a 
defensive alliance including Western European countries, Canada and the United States. 
The impetus for the development of the North Atlantic Treaty had, therefore, as much to 
do about concern about the inability of the UN to carry out its assigned tasks as it was a 
response to fears about Soviet activities in Europe.
9  
 
The terms of the Washington Treaty reflect this. Article 1 of the treaty makes immediate 
reference to the UN, indicating that the parties undertake "as set forth in the Charter of 
the United Nations" to resolve disputes peacefully and to refrain from "the threat or use 
of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations". Similarly, 
the key collective defence provision of the treaty, Article 5, is framed within the context 
of the Charter and its wording echoes that of the Charter.  
 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them… shall be 
considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an 
armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or 
collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, will assist the party or Parties so attacked… Any such armed attack and 
all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security 
Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken 
the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.   
 
Although the creators of the treaty sought to ensure that the treaty reflected the fact that 
the intention of the new arrangement was to support and augment the United Nations, not 
replace or undermine it, the question of whether the new arrangement was or should be a 
regional arrangement as described in Chapter VIII of the Charter dogged the 
announcement of the treaty and its ratification by the US Senate. If the new collective 
defence arrangement was meant to support the UN then, logically, it should be a regional 
arrangement according to Chapter VIII of the Charter. But for all that the signatories to 
the North Atlantic Treaty wanted the new arrangement to be a supportive one, what they 
did not want was for the alliance to be subject to the regional arrangement requirements 
                                                 
9 For more on the creation of NATO see, Nicholas Henderson, The Birth of NATO, London, Weidenfel & 
Nicholson, 1982; Joseph Smith, ed. The Origins of NATO, Exeter, University of Exeter Press, 1990.  
  6 of Chapter VIII as this would subject them to the reporting requirements of Article 54
10 
and, more to the point, would subject their activities to the Soviet veto in the Security 
Council. As one set of analysts stated, "the Treaty thus operates inside the Charter but 
outside the veto."
11 
 
To avoid the implications of Chapter VIII, the treaty is reliant on making its link to the 
Charter through the Article 51 provision on self defence, although never completely 
excluding the possibility that the alliance could play the role of a regional arrangement as 
defined in Chapter VIII. So, although the linkage between the North Atlantic Treaty and 
the Charter was definite, it was not clear-cut. This characterization - connected but not 
linked - effectively summarizes the nature of the relationship as it has continued since 
NATO's creation.  
 
UN-NATO Relations during the Cold War  
 
The possibility that NATO might be used in support of the UN arose, albeit fleetingly, on 
two occasions during the Cold War. The first occurred in the context of the various 
efforts that arose from the Korean War experience and the Uniting for Peace resolution. 
One of the products of the Uniting for Peace Resolution was the creation of the 
Collective Measures Committee. The Committee was charged with developing ways of 
strengthening the UN’s ability to deal with international peace and security issues. Within 
the Committee the United States argued that NATO should be given a role in aiding the 
UN in carrying out its enforcement measures. The proposal did not result in any action on 
the issue, at least in part due to a lack of enthusiasm from other NATO members.
12 
 
The second instance occurred during the early stages of the Cyprus crisis in 1964. In 
response to the deteriorating situation on the island, Britain proposed that a NATO force 
be used as a peacekeeping force to ensure peace while political efforts to resolve the 
dispute could occur. The US supported the proposal, as did Greece and Turkey. The 
Greek Cypriot leader refused to agree, however, even after a revised plan was created. 
The proposal was dropped and the issue went to the Security Council. It is not evident 
that the force would have been used even had agreement been achieved. The Soviet 
Union was very against the idea and other NATO states were not particularly 
enthusiastic.
13 
 
III. The Idea of Greater Cooperation with Regional Organizations  
 
Prior to the end of the Cold War the idea of making greater use of regional arrangements 
to supplement or take on UN missions received very little attention. After the successful 
                                                 
10 Remember that Article 54 requires reporting not just actions taken but also those "in contemplation".  
11 Richard H. Heindel, Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, Francis O. Wilcox, "The North Atlantic Treaty in the United 
States Senate," American Journal of International Law, vol. 43, no. 4, October 1949, p. 638. Emphasis in 
original.  
12 Martin A. Smith, “At Arm’s Length: NATO and the United Nations in the Cold War Era,” International 
Peacekeeping, vol. 2, no. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 56-73. 
13 Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, Documents and Commentary, IV, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1981, pp. 91-92. 
  7 UN-authorized operation to liberate Kuwait, the Security Council met at the level of 
heads of government for the first time. Full of a sense that the end of the Cold War had 
opened up the possibility of a new era in the UN's ability to deal with issues of 
international peace and security the Council asked the Secretary-General to prepare a 
report on how the UN might address international peace and security issues in the new 
era.  
 
The Secretary-General's report, An Agenda for Peace, placed emphasis on the idea that 
regional organizations might be used to support UN peace efforts across the spectrum of 
operations from preventive diplomacy to post-conflict peace-building. The Secretary-
General indicated that using regional organizations would not take away from the 
Council's "primary" responsibility in dealing with international peace and security,  
 
but regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation 
with United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but 
also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization 
in international affairs.
14 
 
In the Secretary-General's view, such efforts would have a compounding effect on UN 
efforts.  
 
Consultations between the United Nations and regional arrangements or agencies 
could do much to build international consensus on the nature of a problem and the 
measures required to address it. Regional organizations participating in 
complementary efforts with the United Nations in joint undertakings would 
encourage States outside the region to act supportively. And should the Security 
Council choose specifically to authorize a regional arrangement or organization to 
take the lead in addressing a crisis within its region, it could serve to lend the 
weight of the United Nations to the validity of the regional effort. Carried forward 
in the spirit of the Charter, and as envisioned in Chapter VIII, the approach 
outlined here could strengthen a general sense that democratization is being 
encouraged at all levels in the task of maintaining international peace and 
security, it being essential to continue to recognize that the primary responsibility 
will continue to reside in the Security Council.
15 
 
In his Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
expanded on these ideas, outlining five areas of possible cooperation between the United 
Nations and regional organizations.
16 The Secretary-General noted, however, the varying 
capacities of regional organizations and indicated that this meant that it was not desirable 
to develop a universal model for cooperation but that the UN was willing to aid in 
developing such capacity "when requested to do so and when resources permit."
17  
                                                 
14 An Agenda for Peace, para. 64.  
15 Ibid., para. 65.  
16 These are: cooperation, diplomatic support, operational support, co-deployment, and joint operations. 
Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995, para. 86. 
17 Ibid., para. 87.  
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NATO Views  
 
From the point of view of NATO, the idea of involvement in UN peacekeeping missions 
arose quite quickly in 1992. Between the time of the Oslo Ministerial meeting in June 
1992 and the end of the year, NATO participation in UN missions went from being a 
non-issue to being a fact of life. In the June 1992 Ministerial Communiqué the UN rated 
only a one-paragraph mention in support of the participation of Allied states in UN 
peacekeeping missions.
18 Within six months, NATO, in coordination with the Western 
European Union (WEU) was involved in enforcing the UN embargo against Yugoslavia, 
and was supplying the UNPROFOR operation with staff and equipment to support the 
UNPROFOR headquarters in Bosnia. The alliance not only took on these roles with ease 
and alacrity but declared itself ready for more. In its Communiqué of 17 December 1992, 
the North Atlantic Council stated:  
 
We confirm today the preparedness of our Alliance to support, on a case-by-case 
basis and in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping operations under 
the authority of the UN Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for 
international peace and security. We are ready to respond positively to initiatives 
that the UN Secretary-General might take to seek Alliance assistance in the 
implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions. …. For the first time in its 
history, the Alliance is taking part in UN peacekeeping and sanctions enforcement 
operations.
19  
 
Two points are of interest in this statement in the context of the original debate about the 
relationship between NATO and the United Nations. The first is the point the NAC 
makes about making decisions in accordance with their "own procedures" and the second 
is the firm statement about the Security Council being the body with "primary 
responsibility" on issues of international peace and security. Both of these points 
demonstrate the continuation of NATO's determination to be supportive of the UN while 
also firmly independent in terms of accountability and decision-making.  
 
Events came fast and furious over the next two years, drawing NATO more deeply into 
the Balkan conflict and into the world of UN peacekeeping.  During that time NATO also 
struggled to come to terms conceptually with the arrival of peacekeeping. In 1993, 
NATO military worked on developing a peacekeeping doctrine. And during the 1990s, a 
Political-Military Steering Committee/Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping 
(PMSC/AHG) worked on a variety of peacekeeping related issues.
20  
 
                                                 
18 NATO, "Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council," Press Communiqué M-NAC-1(92)51, 4 
June 1992. Paragraph 13 read, in part, "We reiterate our commitment to strengthening [the UN's] ability to 
carry out its larger endeavours for world peace. We welcome the fact that Allies participate in and 
contribute to United Nations peacekeeping and other efforts." 
19 NATO, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué M-NAC-2(92)106, 17 
December 1992.  
20 See, for example, “Progress Report to Ministers by the Political-Military Steering Committee/Ad Hoc 
Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping,” Press Communiqué, M-NACC-2 (96)169, 11 December 1996.  
  9 But events on the ground outran these efforts. By the time the parties to the Bosnian 
conflict signed a peace agreement in Dayton, NATO’s involvement with the UN had 
gone from virtually non-existent to having been the source of NATO’s first military 
actions since its creation.  
 
 
IV. NATO and the UN in Practice 
 
Maritime and Air Monitoring 
 
NATO’s involvement with the UN in the Balkans began with a July 1992 decision to 
assist in monitoring the sanctions imposed against Yugoslavia by the Security Council.
21 
NATO provided ships and airplanes to the operation known as Operation Sharp Guard.  
 
A few months later, the Security Council passed Resolution 781, which imposed a ban on 
all military flights over Bosnia.
22 However, the resolution did not include any provisions 
for enforcing the ban. This was the result of a compromise between pressure from the US 
to take stronger action in Bosnia, and fear on the part of states with troops on the ground 
that such stronger measures would prompt retaliation against their troops. In anticipation 
of the ban, NATO had already decided to provide the UN with technical monitoring 
assistance.
23 The ban was consistently and repeatedly violated, a fact which kept the 
prospect of moving to enforcement a topic of discussion. It was not until 31 March 1993, 
however, that the Security Council moved to authorize enforcement of the ban.
24 On 2 
April, the North Atlantic Council approved Operation Deny Flight to help implement 
Security Council Resolution 816. The contingency plans for the operation had long been 
in place since enforcement of the ban had been a possibility from the beginning. The 
operation began on 12 April 1993.
25 The rules of engagement for NATO aircraft were 
quite circumscribed, again in recognition of the concerns of troop-contributing countries 
that any serious enforcement action would result in retaliation against their troops. NATO 
planes were prohibited from attacking civilian aircraft or ground installations, even if 
fired upon. Military aircraft were to be engaged and told to leave the zone. If they did not 
comply a warning shot could be fired. Only then, if the military aircraft continued to 
refuse to comply could the NATO aircraft shoot down the plane.
26  
 
A number of events and trends in the Bosnian conflict came together in the spring and 
summer of 1993. At the United Nations, the Security Council created a safe area around 
Srebrenica and then gave five other cities safe area status, but made no provision for 
enforcing the concept. Within the US government, policy on Bosnia, having been through 
a number of incarnations, was focusing on the concept of lift and strike. Under the 
auspices of negotiators Cyrus Vance and David Owen, a peace plan was agreed, and then 
                                                 
21 North Atlantic Council, Statement on NATO Maritime Operations, 10 July 1992.  
22 Security Council Resolution 781, 9 October 1992.  
23 Dick A. Leurdijk, The United Nations and NATO in the Former Yugoslavia, 1991-1996, Limits to 
Diplomacy and Force, The Hague, Clingendael, 1996, p. 29. 
24 Security Council Resolution 816, 31 March 1993.  
25 NATO, “NATO Starts Operation of No-Fly Zone Enforcement,” Press Release (93) 29, 12 April 1993.  
26 Leurdijk, p. 31.  
  10 destroyed when the Bosnian Serb parliament voted not to accept its terms. And in the 
midst of all of these changes the conflict within Bosnia continued to deepen and worsen. 
Together, these events created a situation that pushed NATO members towards an 
internal crisis over the use of force in Bosnia.  
 
Safe Areas  
 
The safe area idea first came about in response to the siege at Srebrenica in mid-March 
1993, and the inability of the UN to get humanitarian aid past the Bosnian Serb troops 
surrounding the area. On 16 April 1993, the Security Council unanimously passed 
Resolution 819 establishing Srebrenica as a safe area. The idea of safe area was to create 
a zone free from armed attack. The resolution required the Bosnian Serb troops in the 
area to withdraw and the Yugoslav government to cease supplying Bosnian Serb troops 
with arms. It also authorized a Security Council mission to go to the area to investigate 
the situation. When the Security Council mission returned, it recommended considering 
an expansion of the safe area concept to other cities, though on very conditioned terms, 
including an expanded UNPROFOR presence and clear determination on the part of the 
Security Council to enforce and defend the safe areas if necessary.
27 The Security 
Council responded on 6 May 1993, by passing Resolution 824, which extended the safe 
area concept to the cities of Bihac, Gorazde, Sarajevo, Tuzla and Zepa. But the Council 
did not follow the Security Council mission’s other recommendations and provide for any 
enforcement of the safe areas. It may have been counting on the Vance-Owen 
negotiations to bring about a peace agreement. However, in mid-May the Bosnian Serbs 
overwhelmingly rejected the plan. Two weeks later, the Security Council took further 
action on the safe areas, this time expanding the mandate. Now UNPROFOR troops were 
required to deter attacks on the safe areas, to monitor the withdrawal of military and 
paramilitary from the area and to assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid.
28  
 
In the Secretary-General's plan for implementation of the safe area resolution the 
Secretary-General estimated that 34,000 additional troops would be necessary if 
UNPROFOR was to ensure full respect for the safe areas.
29 In recognition of the fact that 
that level of troop contributions was extremely unlikely, the Secretary-General also 
proposed a “light option” involving 7,600 troops, indicating that this option would rely 
“on the threat of air action against any belligerents”
30 to ensure defence of the safe areas. 
Inevitably the Security Council chose to endorse the light option and it was a full year 
before even that lesser number of troops was provided to the operation. 
 
After the passage of the safe areas resolution, NATO undertook a series of meetings to 
determine the implications of the safe area policy and how and if NATO should respond 
to the formal request from the UN for NATO to undertake the coordination of the air 
cover task for the safe areas. Meeting in Athens on 10 June 1993, the NAC announced its 
willingness to undertake this task.  
                                                 
27 S/25700, 30 April 1993.  
28 Security Council Resolution 836, 4 June 1993.  
29 S/25939, 14 June 1993.  
30 Ibid.  
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In response to UNSC Resolution 836 and the expanded UNPROFOR mandate 
related to safe areas, we offer our protective airpower in case of attack against 
UNPROFOR in the performance of its overall mandate, if it so requests. We have 
asked the NATO Military Authorities, who have already undertaken preliminary 
work, to proceed rapidly with detailed planning for the air support that we are 
ready to provide, in coordination with UNPROFOR and other participating 
states.
31 
 
One of the most notable aspects of this decision is that the offer of protective airpower 
applies to UNPROFOR with respect to its "overall mandate" not just with respect to the 
safe areas. In effect, NATO was not only acceding to the UN request but going one step 
further. This point received almost no recognition at the time. Equally, the fact that what 
NATO was offering was protective air support "in case of attack" was also a distinction 
that was often lost. Air cover did not equal air strikes and was very specifically a self 
defence, not an offensive role.
32 
 
US Policy  
 
During the first half of 1993, the Clinton administration struggled to develop a policy on 
the Bosnian conflict.
33 Initially, they settled on advocating a policy called “lift and 
strike”, a policy that proposed lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims, and 
using limited air strikes against the heavy weapons sites the Bosnian Serbs were using to 
bomb places like Sarajevo, as a way of leveling the playing field between the parties. 
When the US ran this idea by NATO allies it was not met with an enthusiastic response. 
The US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, traveled to Europe in April in order to 
discuss the US ideas with NATO allies. Those NATO member-states with troops on the 
ground remained unhappy about anything that might put their troops at risk of retaliation 
from Bosnian Serb troops.
34 In combination with the very clear US unwillingness to 
consider putting their own troops on the ground, the advocacy of air strikes by the 
Clinton Administration served to deepen an already serious divide between the US and 
other NATO members. After its unsuccessful consultations with the NATO allies, the 
Clinton Administration let the “lift and strike” policy fade. But events, in particular the 
bombing of Sarajevo and the humanitarian crisis it created, soon prompted Clinton, at 
least, to push for some form of action.  
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  12 The Shift to Air Strikes  
 
It was against this backdrop – the failure of the Vance-Owen peace plan, the desire of the 
US to do something without risking its own involvement in a potential quagmire, as well 
as the establishment of the safe areas with no effective augmentation of the UNPROFOR 
force on the ground– that the idea of air strikes made a resurgence. Again it was the US 
who took the lead on the issue.
35 In contrast to the first round on air strikes, this time the 
US was determined about the idea. In late July, two US officials traveled to Britain and 
France to discuss the shift in US policy. The US officials put the new US policy in strong 
terms, with one official making clear “that the future of the alliance was on the line.”
36 
The consultations, which continued after the officials returned home, appeared to give the 
US sufficient impetus to decide to take the issue to an alliance meeting.  
 
The North Atlantic Council held a special meeting in Brussels on 2 August 1993 to 
discuss the issue. In a lengthy, deeply contentious, highly-charged debate alliance 
members debated the air strike idea. As it had been all along, the divide was between the 
US, advocating a more forceful approach to the conflict in the form of air strikes, and 
member states with troops on the ground in Bosnia who were unhappy and unwilling to 
consider action that might put those troops at risk of Bosnian Serb retaliation. After 
considerable discussion and machinations the NAC agreed to a conditioned use of air 
strikes.
37 The NAC Communiqué stated:  
 
The Alliance has now decided to make immediate preparations for undertaking, in 
the event that the strangulation of Sarajevo and other areas continues, including 
wide-scale interference with humanitarian assistance, stronger measures including 
air strikes against those responsible, Bosnian Serbs and others, in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. These measures will be under the authority of the United Nations 
Security Council and within the framework of relevant UN Security Council 
resolutions, and in support of UNPROFOR in the performance of its overall 
mandate. For that purpose, full co-ordination will be carried out with the United 
Nations, including appropriate arrangements between the NATO Military 
Authorities and UNPROFOR and consultation with UNHCR.
38 
 
The compromise was a partial victory for both sides. The US had gained alliance 
agreement to stronger measures in the form of air strikes. Troop-contributing countries, 
however, had ensured that those stronger measures were subject to UNPROFOR approval 
and had, therefore, bought a form of protection for their troops. In announcing the 
subsequent agreement on command and control and operational arrangements between 
NATO and the UN, the North Atlantic Council emphasized that the decision to use air 
strikes was one that was in support of the UN operation. “The Council underlines again 
that the air strikes foreseen by the Council decisions of August 2 are limited to the 
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  13 support of humanitarian relief, and must not be interpreted as a decision to intervene 
militarily in the conflict.”
39 Inevitably, perhaps, the compromise, known as the dual-key 
because any use of air strikes required a positive decision from both NATO and the UN, 
created more problems than it resolved.  
 
Sarajevo Weapons Exclusion Zone  
 
Once agreed, air strikes did not occur in the first months after the contentious decision. 
The deteriorating situation in two safe areas - Srebrenica and Tuzla - however, prompted 
Britain and France to push for consideration of military measures to deal with them. At 
the January meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the NAC included in their 
communiqué a statement about the two safe areas. "We urge the UNPROFOR authorities 
to draw up urgently plans to ensure that the blocked rotation of the UNPROFOR 
contingent in Srebrenica can take place and to examine how the airport at Tuzla can be 
opened for humanitarian relief purposes."
40 Britain and France forwarded the NATO 
declaration to the UN secretary-general, accompanying the declaration with proposals 
“about exceptional command-and-control arrangements which they thought would be 
appropriate for military operations specifically related to the current situation in those 
two safe areas.”
41 The British and French efforts and NATO's reiteration of its 
willingness to use air power in Bosnia prompted a response from the Russians who were 
now very concerned about the balance of decision-making power shifting too far in 
favour of NATO. In their démarches 
to the secretary-general on the subject they re-stated their position that “any use of force . 
. . should be subject to prior consultations by the Secretary-General with the members of 
the Security Council and that only after such consultations should a decision be made to 
seek enforcement assistance from any source, including NATO.”
42  
 
Through the winter attention increasingly turned to the worsening situation in Sarajevo. 
Then, as often happened in the Bosnian war, a single event changed the equation. On 5 
February 1994, an artillery shell hit the Sarajevo marketplace. Sixty-eight people were 
killed and 200 wounded.
43  The event galvanized the international community into a 
response. Interest focused on the idea of establishing a weapons exclusion zone around 
Sarajevo in order to end the siege, a proposal that had previously been put forward by the 
French.  
 
The story of establishing the weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo remains complex 
and disputed. NATO and the UN proceeded along parallel but generally unlinked tracks. 
The day after the bombing of the marketplace, the Secretary-General issued a request to 
NATO asking for assistance in preparing for air strikes against the weapons that were 
being used against Sarajevo [get document]. Three days later, the North Atlantic Council 
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  14 approved the request but did so in the context of establishing a heavy weapons exclusion 
zone around Sarajevo and issuing an ultimatum to the parties requiring their compliance 
with the exclusion zone. The Council decisions required both the Bosnian Serbs and the 
Government of Bosnia to remove their heavy weapons within ten days, and required the 
Bosnian government “to refrain from attacks launched from within the current 
confrontation lines”. It also stated that within ten days “heavy weapons of any of the 
parties found within the Sarajevo exclusion zone, unless controlled by UNPROFOR, will, 
along with their direct and essential military support facilities, be subject to NATO air 
strikes.”
44 The NAC then accepted the UN Secretary-General's request for assistance with 
air strikes and authorized the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe:  
 
to launch air strikes, at the request of the United Nations, against artillery or 
mortar positions in and around Sarajevo (including any outside the exclusion 
zone) which are determined by UNPROFOR to be responsible for attacks against 
civilian targets in that city.
45 
 
A couple of points are important here. First, there are two separate options relating to air 
strikes being authorized. The first was the threat to use air strikes to enforce the exclusion 
zone if the parties did not meet the requirements within ten days. The second was the 
positive response, effectively immediately, to the Secretary-General's request to use 
NATO assets to conduct air strikes against weapons around Sarajevo if they were being 
used against civilian targets. The second point is that while the NAC decisions make 
reference to UN Security Council resolutions, the establishment of the weapons exclusion 
zone is a NAC decision and is not directly related to any Security Council provision, 
though it arguably supported the enforcement of Sarajevo's safe area status. Russia 
argued forcefully but ultimately unsuccessfully for a new Security Council resolution. 
 
The crisscrossing authority and decision-making was made further complicated by 
negotiations on the ground in Sarajevo between the UNPROFOR commander, British 
General Michael Rose and the Bosnian Serbs. While the NAC was meeting to reach its 
own decisions, General Rose reached an agreement with the Bosnian Serbs to an 
immediate cease-fire around Sarajevo and the placement of their heavy weapons under 
UNPROFOR control. The UN and NATO were thus proceeding along two different 
tracks. In the end, the two tracks were kept together by a direct connection between the 
UNPROFOR commander and British Lt.-Gen. Rupert Smith. According to General Rose, 
the latter was involved in the NATO discussions and was able to ensure that the NATO 
and UN language corresponded.
46 The heavy press coverage of NATO decision to 
establish a heavy weapons exclusion zone, however, made it seem as if the outcome was 
simply a product of NATO’s “ultimatum”.  
 
One of the often-overlooked aspects of this sequence of events is the involvement of 
Russia. The Russians were increasingly irritated and angry about the role of NATO and 
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  15 the lack of consultation with Russia. Although Bosnian Serb forces did not comply 
entirely with the exclusion zone deadline, the UNPROFOR command determined that 
progress towards compliance was sufficient enough to that point to avoid the use of air 
strikes, and full compliance was achieved within a few days.
47 The general conclusion 
drawn from this is that the threat of air strikes forced Bosnian Serb compliance and 
brought about an end, although temporary, to the siege of Sarajevo. But the Bosnian Serb 
compliance came late in the game and only after the intervention of the Russians. The 
Russian decision, just days before the NATO deadline, to move their UNPROFOR troops 
from Croatia to Sarajevo was critical to the Bosnian Serb decision to comply. David 
Owen provides an interesting analysis of the situation. 
 
The Russian initiative seemed to have been taken without informing the US and 
without the knowledge of [Britain]. The Russians had not hidden their intense 
irritation at the NATO decision, from which they felt excluded. They warned that 
[Bosnian Serb General Ratko] Mladic would be delighted if NATO air strikes 
took place, since it would unite all Serbs and give him the freedom he did not 
currently have. . . . [S]ome said [that Bosnian Serb compliance] was a vindication 
of the threat of air strikes and a sign that the Bosnian Serbs would crumble under 
threat. I felt that it was the Russians who had taken the threat of NATO air strikes 
seriously and that it was their decision to move their troops to Sarajevo which had 
forced Mladic to act over his heavy weapons.
48  
 
Gorazde and Bihac 
 
In early April 1994, Bosnian Serb shelling of the safe area Gorazde brought the issue of 
air strikes to the forefront again. In response to a request from UNPROFOR commander 
General Rose, approved by the UN Special Envoy, NATO launched attacks against Serb 
targets at Gorazde on 10 and 11 April. The long predicted retaliation from the Bosnian 
Serbs came quickly. They detained 155 UNPROFOR troops, closed the road to Sarajevo, 
and refused to communicate with UNPROFOR leaders. A few days later, on 15 April, 
they resumed their shelling of Gorazde. The renewed shelling generated two responses. 
Russia, who had previously condemned the NATO air strikes now shifted their position 
to condemn the Bosnian Serbs. At the UN, the Secretary-General sent a request to the 
NATO Secretary-General asking him to obtain authorization for air strikes to be carried 
out by NATO “at the request of the United Nations” for the five other safe areas.
49 As it 
had done with respect to Sarajevo, the NAC both acquiesced to the UN Secretary-
General’s request and separately established a “military exclusion zone” around Gorazde. 
The NAC gave the Bosnian Serbs five days to meet the requirements of the exclusion 
zone, indicating that if the deadline was not met, NATO would use air strikes.
50 The 
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  16 question of whether the Bosnian Serbs complied with the deadline was subject to dispute. 
The UN representatives felt that there was sufficient compliance to avoid the use of air 
strikes. NATO was less convinced and the disagreement prompted consultation between 
the secretaries-general of the two organizations and a fine tuning of the air strike 
procedure. In a shift from previous policy it was now agreed that either side - NATO or 
the UN - could call for air strikes, though the decision to launch them still had to be a 
joint one.
51  
 
In late November 1994, another safe area, Bihac, became the focus of the conflict, 
prompting another round of tense decision-making about how to respond. The Bihac 
crisis brought together a number of the pressures and trends created by the shift to air 
strikes. Deep in western Bosnia, the Bihac fighting touched on vital interests of the Kra-
jina-based Serbs, Croats in the same area, and the Croatian, Bosnian, and Yugoslav 
governments. For the same reasons that Bihac was important geographically to all of the 
parties, it was difficult militarily for the UN and NATO. Establishing another exclusion 
zone was problematic because of Bihac's proximity to the Croatian border. There were 
also significant Bosnian Serb military assets in the area that posed a threat to NATO 
aircraft and UNPROFOR troops in the area were poorly equipped and highly vulnerable 
to retaliation. All of this was also occurring in the context of the Clinton Administration's 
decision to stop enforcing the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims.
52 
 
In response to the attacks on Bihac, on 19 November the Security Council passed 
Resolution 958, which extended the authority for the use of air power, authorized in 
Resolution 836, to Croatia.
53 Two days later NATO planes carried out air strikes against 
the Udbina airfield (though not planes based there) in Croatia, which was being used as a 
base for the some of the attacks against Bihac. This was followed by NATO attacks 
against a surface-to-air missile sites over the next few days.
54 The Bosnian Serbs 
retaliated by taking approximately 400 UNPROFOR personnel hostage.  
 
This latest round in the crisis brought virtually every policy aspect of the international 
response to the boiling point. The taking of UNPROFOR troops hostages had the desired 
effect of bringing an end to air strikes. There was absolutely no question that the Bosnian 
Serbs were violating, even flaunting the UN Security Council resolutions. Without 
further action from the UN, the whole Security Council approach, already fragile, would 
be significantly undermined. On 25 November, the North Atlantic Council met to discuss 
a number of different proposals for action, including a US proposal for a much wider 
campaign of air strikes to be used to bring the conflict to an end. In spite of US pressure 
to continue with air strikes, troop-contributing allies were unmovable. This divide 
between the US and other alliance members had now reached crisis proportions within 
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  17 NATO. In the end, the North Atlantic Council made no decisions on new action.
55 There 
was no new policy direction save one important change in US policy. Reacting to the 
depth of the now very deep divide among NATO allies, the Clinton Administration, 
having considered pursuing air strikes unilaterally, determined that their first priority was 
alliance unity, rather than the immediate problems of the Bosnia crisis.
56  
 
Instead of air strikes, the administration decided that henceforth the objective of 
US policy toward Bosnia would be, first, to mend the rift in the alliance; second, 
to contain the war in Bosnia and prevent its spread throughout the Balkans; and, 
only third, to help preserve the territorial integrity of Bosnia through 
negotiation.
57  
 
For the UN, the Bihac crisis also marked a fundamental turning point. Its inability to 
enforce its mandate and the obvious vulnerability of its troops was having a severe effect 
on its credibility. For the first time, serious discussion of a possible withdrawal of the 
UNPROFOR operation took place.
58   
 
A pause to regroup became possible on all fronts when former US President Jimmy 
Carter negotiated a four-month cease-fire with the parties to the conflict. The cease-fire 
was mostly observed, at least sufficiently so to avoid an immediate return to major 
conflict.  
 
Back to Sarajevo  
 
While the ceasefire provided some temporary respite, it also provided time for the parties 
to the conflict to rearm and prepare for the next round. At the political level little in the 
way of preparation for the next phase of the conflict occurred. But events on the ground 
soon forced all of the major actors – NATO, the UN, the US – to re-evaluate and 
fundamentally change their approach to the conflict.  
 
After the four-month ceasefire ended, the Bosnian Serbs soon resumed shelling of 
Sarajevo. These actions, in conjunction with their withdrawal of heavy weapons from 
some of the UN weapons collection points, prompted UNPROFOR to issue another set of 
deadlines for the return of the weapons, and the removal of new weapons that had been 
brought in to the exclusion zone by both sides. When this deadline was not met, NATO 
forces used air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. This time, the air strikes, which took 
place over two days, were launched against ammunition depots and other military sites 
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  18 near the Bosnian Serb headquarters at Pale, just outside Sarajevo. The strikes against the 
Pale targets marked the first time that force had been used against military targets other 
than those specifically linked to attacks in violation of the mandate and was a significant 
shift in UN and NATO strategy. The Bosnian Serb response was quick and forceful. They 
took a number of UNPROFOR troops hostage, placing them as highly visible “human 
shields” at possible air strike target locations. They closed down the access routes to 
Sarajevo and retrieved more heavy weapons from the UN collection points. On 26 May 
they bombed the safe area of Tuzla, in an attack that killed 71 people.
59 For the UN, the 
focus immediately shifted away from air strikes to negotiating the release of the 
UNPROFOR troops. The concept of Sarajevo as a safe area was effectively destroyed 
and the UN Secretary-General undertook a fundamental review of the situation. At 
NATO, contingency planning for assisting an UNPROFOR withdrawal, which had begun 
after Bihac was completed. The North Atlantic Council met to consider the situation and 
issued a strong statement condemning the Bosnian Serb actions. The statement read, in 
part:  
 
The Alliance, with the full solidarity of its members, condemns in the strongest 
terms the outrageous behaviour of the Bosnian Serbs. The Alliance condemns the 
killing and detention of UN peacekeepers and the making of unacceptable threats 
against the lives of those who are being held hostage.  ….NATO demands that the 
Bosnian Serbs release these UN peacekeepers immediately, and supports every 
effort of the UN to ensure their safety and bring about their release. The Alliance 
also condemns the barbaric shelling of the UN-designated safe areas, in particular 
the attacks on Tuzla, which has led to the slaughter of a large number of innocent 
civilians.  We demand that the Bosnian Serbs stop these attacks on the safe areas 
and comply with the UNPROFOR ultimatum to remove all heavy weapons from 
the Sarajevo exclusion zone or place them under effective UN control.  The 
Alliance remains ready to respond to requests from the United Nations for further 
action in support of these objectives.
60 
 
 
During July, two safe areas fell victim to the Bosnian Serbs. On 12 July, in a sequence of 
events that continues to haunt the international community, Bosnian Serb forces took 
over Srebrenica and expelled and killed thousands of Muslims. Bihac, an ongoing source 
of conflict since the autumn, came under attack by Serbs in the Krajina region. Less than 
two weeks later, on 25 July, Zepa also fell. The Security Council responded to the fall of 
Srebrenica with a resolution condemning the Bosnian Serb actions and calling for the 
restoration of Srebrenica as a safe area.
61 But the resolution was only declaratory; the 
Council made no provision and took no decisions to follow through on its terms.  
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  19 Much of the activity in response to the pressure on the safe areas occurred within NATO 
circles. UK Prime Minister John Major called a crisis meeting of foreign and defence 
ministers of NATO members as well as Russia. The meeting generated two decisions that 
changed the existing policies. The first was to draw “a line in the sand” around 
Gorazde.
62 Should the Bosnian Serbs attempt to take that safe areas, there would be a 
“firm and rapid” NATO response.
63 The second was a decision to streamline the dual-key 
decision-making process. The North Atlantic Council met on 25 July and approved the 
decisions of the London meeting. Speaking after the NAC meeting, NATO’s Secretary-
General stated:  
 
The planning we have undertaken is built upon the Council's decisions of August 
1993 and April 1994 and falls under the authority of existing UN Security 
Council resolutions. Over the past few days, I have had contacts with Secretary 
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and after the Council tonight I made the first 
reports over the phone regarding the decisions and I have immediately sent to 
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali a detailed summary of our decisions so 
that he has the opportunity with his experts to study immediately the contents of 
the decisions made by the NAC. NATO will now be working urgently together 
with the UN to ensure the necessary coordination. … NATO's planning is 
designed to ensure that military preparations by the Bosnian Serbs which are 
judged to present a direct threat to Gorazde, or direct Bosnian Serb attacks on 
Gorazde, will be met with the firm and rapid response of NATO's air power. The 
planning provides for NATO and the UN to take the necessary decisions to launch 
significant air strikes in the event of such actions. There is a strong feeling among 
Allies that such operations, once they are launched, will not lightly be 
discontinued. In the face of the inherent risks, the Alliance is determined.
64 
 
The following week, the NAC met again and decided to extend the Gorazde 
arrangements to Bihac, Tuzla and Sarajevo.
65 As these events and decisions demonstrate, 
NATO was taking on an increasingly prominent role in the international response to the 
conflict. While NATO decisions consistently emphasized that they were made in support 
of Security Council resolutions, the decision-making balance was now shifting heavily 
towards NATO and away from the Security Council.  
 
In response to the agreed streamlining of the dual-key system, at the United Nations, the 
Secretary-General announced that he was delegating his dual-key authority to the 
UNPROFOR commander in the field. This decision meant that the Secretary-General was 
bypassing his special envoy, who had been a controversial figure,
66 and giving the 
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  20 authority to decide on air strikes to UNPROFOR military commanders who happened to 
be from NATO member states.  
 
In order to streamline decision-making within the United Nations chain of 
command when air strikes are deemed to be necessary, I have decided to delegate 
the necessary authority in this respect to the Force Commander …As regards 
close air support …my special representative has today delegated the necessary 
authority to the Force Commander (General Janvier) who is authorized to 
delegate it further to the commander of the United Nations Protection 
Force…when operational circumstances so require.
67  
 
Operation Deliberate Force  
 
Galvanized by the events of the summer, as well as the possibility of a UN withdrawal in 
which large numbers of US troops would be involved, the Clinton Administration 
focused new energy and people on developing a policy that would bring the war to an 
end. President Clinton appointed Richard Holbrooke to be the lead US negotiator on 
Bosnia, and Holbrooke became deeply involved in both the political and military 
decision-making that followed, bringing the two strands of international responses – the 
peace process and the military response – together for the first time.  
 
Over the summer of 1995, the gradual shift towards acceptance of the idea of a greater 
use of force gained momentum. The decisions in NATO to establish parameters for 
action and to streamline the dual-key decision-making system established the foundation 
for a more directed, coherent response to events. NATO and the US were already primed 
to respond, therefore, when the Bosnian Serbs handed them an excuse for action by 
bombing the Markale marketplace in Sarajevo on 28 August. Thirty-seven people were 
killed and more than 80 were wounded. Under Holbrooke, the US had begun to make 
public statements indicating that it was willing to consider a wide use of air strikes if 
more progress was not made at the negotiating table. For them, the bombing of the 
marketplace that same day seemed a direct challenge. The United Nations established 
very quickly that the Bosnian Serbs had launched the mortar. In response, the 
UNPROFOR commander in Sarajevo initiated a request for air strikes. The NATO 
Commander agreed with the request for air strikes. Based on that dual-key authorization, 
on 30 August 1995, NATO launched Operation Deliberate Force.
68  
 
NATO was now firmly in control of the military side of the equation, and through 
Holbrooke, the US negotiator, the parameters and possibility of a peace agreement were 
now also tied in to the military response. The bombing was halted from 1-4 September to 
provide an opportunity for negotiation and for the Bosnian Serbs to the conditions 
outlined by NATO and the UN about moving their heavy weapons from around 
Sarajevo.
69 A hint as to the extent of the shift in the balance of the decision-making from 
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69 As cited in Leudjik, p. 80. 
  21 the UN to NATO is given in a statement by the UN Secretary-General at the time. The 
statement reads:  
 
I have been informed tonight by NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes of the 
reiteration by the North Atlantic Council of the international community’s 
demand that the Bosnian Serbs take immediate steps to end the threat to the safe 
area of Sarajevo, in particular by withdrawing their heavy weapons from the 20 
kilometre exclusion zone around the city. My staff and I have been in close 
contact with NATO throughout the day and I myself have spoken to Secretary-
General Claes. I associate myself fully with the position of NATO and call upon 
the Bosnian Serbs to comply with the requirements communicated to them by the 
Force Commander.
70   
 
When diplomatic efforts generated little in the way of a response, and the Bosnian Serb 
forces did not respond to the conditions relating to heavy weapons, the bombing began 
again on 5 September.
71 Speaking at a press briefing, Admiral Leighton Smith stated: 
“The reason for the recommencement is that NATO and the United Nations have 
collectively agreed on certain conditions which must be met. Those conditions 1, were 
not met, and 2, certainly there was no indication that there was intent on the Bosnian 
Serbs’ part to meet them.”
72  
 
Operation Deliberate Force continued until 14 September, when another pause was 
implemented in response to an agreement by the Bosnian Serbs to comply with the 
NATO-UN conditions. On 17 September the bombing pause was extended for 72 hours 
in light of Bosnian Serb efforts to meet those conditions.
73 At the conclusion of that time, 
NATO and the UN determined that the Bosnian Serbs had met their conditions and 
Operation Deliberate Force was suspended.
74     
 
Conclusions  
 
The idea that NATO would support and contribute to the provisions of the United 
Nations Charter, an idea so carefully included in the Washington Treaty, has stood the 
test of time, and the test of a major crisis. NATO undertook actions to assist the United 
                                                 
70 United Nations, “Statement attributable to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,” no document 
number, New York, 2 September 1995.  
71 Statement by the Secretary General of NATO, Press Release (95) 79, 5 September 1995.  
72 Transcript of Press Conference, Admiral Leighton W. Smith, Commander in Chief Allied Forces 
Southern Europe, NATO Club HZ. AFSOUTH, Naples, Italy, 9 AM, 6 September 1995. See also Roger 
Cohen, “A NATO Deadline Passes Without Attack,” New York Times, 5 September 1995, pp. A1, A9. 
According to Holbrooke, the decision to restart the bombing campaign had to overcome tremendous 
resistance from within NATO as well as from U.S. military officials. The pro-resumption side won out after 
Bosnian Serb General Mladic sent a letter threatening to widen the conflict and attack other safe areas. 
Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 118, 131–132. 
73 AFSOUTH, "Joint Statement by Adm Leighton W. Smith and Lt. Gen. Bernard Janvier, Extension of 
Suspension of NATO Air Strikes," Naples, Release Number: 95-42, 17 September 1995.  
74 The operation involved 3,515 sorties during which 1,026 bombs were dropped. AFSOUTH, Operation 
Deliberate Force, Fact Sheet, http://www.afsouth.nato.int/factsheets/DeliberateForceFactSheet.htm. Last 
visited 5 June 2001.  
  22 Nations in its efforts to maintain international peace and security, and did so as a regional 
organization, while maintaining its separateness from the provisions of Chapter VIII of 
the UN Charter. But this continuity is not a function of design or determination, and tells 
only a very small part of the story.   
 
Both organizations operate on the assumption that political decision-making drives 
military action. Choices about courses of action are made at the political level and then 
implemented, if necessary, militarily. But the United Nations almost immediately lost its 
military implementation arm when the Military Staff Committee faltered and then 
stalemated into inaction in 1948. The creation of peacekeeping in the mid-1950s was an 
innovation that served to overcome that vacuum by providing the UN with the ability to 
implement its decisions militarily, in certain circumstances. The idea of greater 
cooperation with regional organizations was another way of giving the UN an ability to 
implement its decisions. As the experience during UNPROFOR indicates, that option 
comes with a number of implications that raise serious questions about the viability and 
desirability of operating that way in future.  
 
Theoretically, in assisting the United Nations in implementing Security Council 
resolutions, NATO is acting as the military implementation arm for the political decision-
making of the Security Council. But before this can happen, NATO itself must make a 
political decision to use its military assets to assist the United Nations. But NATO's 
political decision-making was not isolated simply to the decision to use its military assets 
in support of the United Nations. This should not be surprising. Even at the best of times 
and in the most straightforward of circumstances once their own military assets were 
engaged NATO's ability to leave the decision-making about how best to deal with the 
conflict entirely in the hands of the Security Council would be tested. These were not the 
best of times nor the most straightforward of circumstances. Key NATO member states 
already had significant numbers of troops on the ground as part of the UNPROFOR 
operation. The Security Council's resolutions were complicated and often contradictory. 
There was often little hope or even expectation that the resolutions would be fulfilled. For 
all of these reasons NATO's entry into the military realm of the UNPROFOR operation 
meant its entry into the political realm as well.  
 
NATO's entry into the political realm made an already complicated situation extremely 
complex. This was a scene already replete with individual and institutional actors 
carrying multiple agendas and loyalties. Some NATO member states were on the 
Security Council. Some had troops on the ground. Some were also involved in the 
Western European Union's maritime operation in support of the embargo against the 
former Yugoslavia. European Union members also were involved in the peace 
negotiations through their representative at the peace talks, and some NATO members 
were part of the Contact Group established after Bihac. Depending on your point of view 
this was either a tenuously linked precariously balanced multi-layered web representing 
the scope and breadth of the international community’s concern, or a scattered, 
incoherent and ineffectual collection of international responses. In either case, the weight 
and nature of NATO's involvement could easily have destroyed the existing structure, 
dispersing the existing units. Although there were moments when that result seemed the 
  23 most likely, instead of dissolving and dispersing the actors NATO's pursuit of its own 
policies served to consolidate and streamline the international response to the crisis.  
 
This outcome was not a given. The shifts that occurred to bring NATO into the forefront 
of the international response were more a product of force of circumstance than planning 
or intent. Nowhere was the fact that there were now two organizations accompanied by 
two sets of decision-making processes more evident than in the infamous dual-key 
arrangement for using NATO's air assets. The frustration with the dual key arrangement, 
both because of its inefficiency and resulting ineffectualness, and because it was a source 
of political controversy, was, in the end, what prompted the consolidation of decision-
making between NATO and the UN when it came to the implementation side of the 
equation. That consolidation was symbolic of a shift in decision-making that was already 
in progress. Well before the dual-key arrangement was effectively handed to NATO, 
NATO had begun to play a significant role at the political level. Once NATO military 
assets were engaged, and prompted by the continuing deterioration of the situation on the 
ground and the division among NATO members over the appropriate response, the North 
Atlantic Council met frequently on the Bosnia question. As time went on, the statements 
it issued after those meetings increasingly resembled Security Council resolutions in both 
tone and substance. While those statements always emphasized that NATO actions were 
taken in support of Security Council resolutions, they were evidence of the extent to 
which NATO was taking on a political role that closely equated that of the Security 
Council. While NATO was clear about its role as an implementer and supporter of 
Security Council resolutions, that support occasionally resembled competition. There 
was, however, one important difference in the NATO statements. By the time of its 
decisions about Bihac and Gorazde, the NAC statements were outspoken about their 
condemnation of Bosnian Serb actions in a way that simply did not and could not occur 
in the Security Council. NATO had neither a need nor a desire to maintain a position of 
impartiality with respect to the parties to the conflict. This need, which the Security 
Council imposed upon itself, constrained the UN’s abilities and choices when the 
situation deteriorated and when the parties to the conflict chose to halt UN action.  
 
The conflict in Bosnia presented both NATO and the United Nations with a situation 
neither had envisaged, either in their founding documents or in the immediate post-Cold 
War when both considered the possibility of greater cooperation with other organizations. 
The crisis and their struggle to find an appropriate individual and joint response to events 
took both organizations dangerously close to the breaking point. For the UN, the Security 
Council's ongoing willingness to add tasks to the mandate when there was little hope of 
success or of resources to fulfill those tasks brought the UNPROFOR operation to the 
verge of collapse and seriously undermined the credibility of the United Nations. For 
NATO, even while it was taking on a strong role at the political level, its own internal 
politics were on shaky ground. The seriousness of the dispute between the United States 
and other NATO member states with troops participating in the UNPROFOR operation 
can not be underestimated. There is little doubt that the crisis brought the alliance near to 
the breaking point.  
 
  24 For NATO, therefore, the story of its involvement in the UNPROFOR operation is a story 
of alliance unity and success. The alliance overcame an internal rift that threatened its 
very existence, and did so at a time of internal transition and re-definition, and at a time 
when its troops were involved in military action for the first time in its history. But this 
fact does not mean that the experience provides a model of organizational policy-making.  
 
NATO policy was US-driven, once the US decided to play a significant political role, and 
US policy was NATO-driven, as evidenced by the US decision to opt for a policy that 
would preserve alliance unity over one that was specifically geared to dealing with the 
conflict. As a consequence of this dynamic United Nations policy was overtaken. 
Overtaken but ultimately served in that the conflict ended and a peace agreement was 
concluded.  
 
Did NATO save the United Nations? Perhaps. At least from the prospect of a complete 
failure of the UNPROFOR operation and a potentially dangerous and costly withdrawal 
from the region. Did the United Nations lose its role as the organization with "primary 
responsibility" for international peace and security issues? No. At least not in the sense 
that its overall objectives in the conflict - a peaceful settlement - were ultimately served. 
But the United Nations did lose its role as the leader of the international political efforts 
to end the conflict in the final stages of the war. In part this effect was a product of the 
Security Council's unwillingness to authorize a response that exceeded the level of 
peacekeeping. The Security Council's authorization of Chapter VII for various aspects of 
the UNPROFOR operation were add-ons to the basic peacekeeping mandate and did not 
take the UN into the realm of enforcement. As a consequence UNPROFOR troops were 
placed in an untenable situation, a fact later recognized in an internal UN report. They 
were constrained in their ability to deal with the situation not only by a lack of resources 
and support but the need to adhere to the peacekeeping doctrines of impartiality and 
consent, a constraint that NATO did not have in its responses.  
 
Organizations, like any entity respond to changed circumstances and environments. 
Together and separately this happened to NATO and the United Nations as a result of the 
UNPROFOR experience. What are the lessons that each organization has taken from the 
experience? For the United Nations Security Council one of the lessons seems to have 
been to refrain from serious involvement in crises in which require a more strenuous 
response than classic peacekeeping. but, for any number of reasons (resources, political 
will etc.), the Security Council is unwilling to engage in the situation. For NATO, if its 
response to Kosovo is any indication, the primary lesson appears to be to steer clear of 
the constraints of UN decision-making when dealing with a conflict on its borders. 
NATO would argue that its actions in Kosovo served the United Nations Charter, as its 
own founding treaty requires it to do. But the sheer fact that NATO's air campaign in 
Kosovo occurred without specific Security Council authorization undermines that 
argument.  
 
For both organizations, the most important and as yet unanswered question to arise from 
the experience is whether or not a regional arrangement can support the political goals 
and decision-making of the United Nations by the provision of military resources to 
  25 implement those decisions without becoming involved in the political side of the 
equation. For the UN, the answer to this question has tremendous implications for the 
question of impartiality in its peacekeeping operations as well as its ability to generate 
sufficient military resources to carry out such operations. For NATO the answer to this 
question is apparently no, or at least that it does not desire to remain separate from the 
political side of the equation when its military assets are being used. Such a 
determination is problematic. NATO is not seeking to replace the UN in its role as the 
primary decision-maker on issues relating to international peace and security and it is 
unlikely that NATO's desire to stay outside the constraints of UN decision-making would 
apply in any other region of the world. Its decision to do so, however, may ultimately 
serve to undermine and weaken the very organization that it is pledged to support.  
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